I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are nonparametrically identified.
Introduction
Matching games are a new and important area of empirical interest. Consider the classic example of marriage.
A researcher may have data on a set of marriages in each of a set of independent matching markets, say a set of towns. The researcher observes characteristics of each man and each woman in each town, as well as the sets of marriages that occurred. The researcher observes equilibrium outcomes, here marriages, and not choice sets, so identification in this type of model will not be able to rely trivially on the analysis of single agent demand models. What type of parameters can be identified from these data?
Economists have studied nonparametric or semiparametric identification in auction games of private information (Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong, 1994) as well as discrete games of complete information (Berry and Tamer, 2006) and incomplete information (Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong and Nekipelov, 2009b) . This previous literature is unified in using noncooperative Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. Matching games are cooperative games and use pairwise stability instead of Nash equilibrium as the main solution concept. This is the first paper to study identification in a new and empirically important class of games.
I follow the classic works of Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) , Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973) and model the formation of matches (say marriages) as the outcome to a competitive market. Agents have preferences over partners and agents can exchange monetary transfers with their spouse. The equilibrium concept is pairwise stability: in part, at an outcome to a marriage market, no man would prefer to pay the transfer required to be able to marry any woman other than his actual wife in the proposed equilibrium. I assume the researcher does not have access to data on the transfers. For marriage, transfers are a modeling abstraction. For interfirm relationships, transfers may be private contractual details. Therefore, this paper studies point identification under partial observability of the outcome variables in the model.
Match data come from the outcome to a market, which intermingles the preferences of all participating agents and finds an equilibrium. An agent may not match with its most preferred partner because that partner is taken. Because agents on the same side of the market are rivals to match with potential partners, the failure for a match to form does not mean that the match gives low production. Given this rivalry for partners, it
is not obvious what types of economic parameters are identified from having equilibrium outcome data from matching markets. Identification asks the question of just what economic parameters can be learned from data on who matches with whom? A production function gives the total output of a match. I prove that features of match production functions can be identified in a transferable utility setting using data on only equilibrium matches. Identification relies on inequalities implied by the equilibrium concept, pairwise stability.
I first study what I label derivative-based identification, as the features of production functions one can learn about may involve derivatives. Derivative-based identification using qualitative match data arises because certain derivatives of match production functions govern sorting patterns in transferable utility matching games.
For example, a cross-partial derivative of the production function represents the importance of complementarities between a pair of characteristics, each from a different agent. Becker (1973) shows that complementarities result in assortative matching. I extend the informal identification result of Becker in several dimensions. For example, I show how to identify the ratio of complementarities in two pairs of agent-specific characteristics in a match production function, say the relative importance of wealth and schooling. This allows a researcher to measure the relative importance of complementarities on different pairs of characteristics. This is equivalent to a multivariate (multiple pairs of characteristics) analysis, while Becker's analytical characterization of the sorting pattern requires that each agent is distinguished by only a single characteristic.
Second, I ask whether a researcher can identify the production function for different types of matches up to a positive monotonic transformation. I learn whether match production is higher at one set of characteristics for the matched parties than another set of characteristics. I extend identification results from the single agent, multinomial choice literature by Matzkin (1993, Theorem 1) . The extension is non-trivial because one cannot freely vary the choice set of a single agent when using data that are the equilibria to matching games. In matching with transfers, one must pay a potential partner to match with you, and the required payment involves the characteristics of rival agents. I prove the identification of match production functions, up to a positive monotonic transformation, by varying the exogenous distribution of the types of agents in a matching market.
My identification arguments do not require data on objects that are not found in many datasets but are important in matching models: the endogenous prices, the number of physical matches that an agent can make (quotas), or continuous outcomes such as production levels, revenues and profits. Quotas are often a modeling abstraction in many-to-many matching; not requiring data on such an abstraction is an advantage. Transfers, production levels, revenues and profits are often not recorded at all (marriage) or not disclosed (interfirm relationships).
The identification arguments are for many-to-many, two-sided matching games. This means each potential agent may be involved in multiple matches with agents on the other side of the market. This generality is essential to applications in industrial organization where, for example, one supplier of goods may match to many retailers of those goods. I do not require a supplier's profit function to be additively separable across the characteristics of its multiple partners. I also prove separate results for three different types of observable characteristics that may enter the payoff of a group of matches: agent-specific characteristics, match-specific characteristics, and characteristics that vary for each group of matches. Importantly, each agent, match or group of matches may have a vector of characteristics.
In many-to-many matching games, I study the identification of production functions that can take as arguments the characteristics of many partners at once. In many-to-many matching, pairwise stability is a weaker solution concept than another solution concept, full stability. One mathematical achievement of the paper is that all identification results use only the restrictions from pairwise stability, which as its name indicates, allows only a single pair of potential partners to consider deviating from the proposed equilibrium at once.
This achievement is important because the communication volume necessary to believe an equilibrium is fully stable is large: arbitrarily large groups of agents would need to coordinate their actions. Theorists are often comfortable specifying that a decentralized matching game's outcome is pairwise stable, but assuming that the outcome is fully stable would be more controversial.
The identification arguments are fully nonparametric: I do not impose that production functions and the stochastic structure of the model are known up to a finite vector of parameters. The stochastic structure of the model uses a rank order property that is inspired by the maximum score literature on single agent, multinomial choice (Manski, 1975; Matzkin, 1993; Fox, 2007) . This maximum score identification approach allows me to work with inequalities that are derived from pairwise stability, rather than working with high-dimensional integrals over match-specific unobservables. This allows me to focus on the matching-market configurations that lead to identification. In single agent, multinomial choice, a similar rank order property is derived as a consequence of the payoff of each discrete choice having an i.i.d. unobservable component. I discuss in some detail why an i.i.d. unobservable component to each match's payoff does not give the necessary rank order property in matching, but such an i.i.d. shock at the assignment level does. I also provide simulation evidence about how much the rank order property is violated in models with i.i.d. unobservable match-specific components.
Another advantage of the rank order property is that the identification arguments lead to a computationally simple estimator. Matching markets can have hundreds or thousands of agents in them. In Fox (2009) , I present such a maximum score estimator for matching games and show how it resolves two curses of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market: a computational curse of dimensionality from otherwise needing to compute or check equilibria and a data curse of dimensionality that might arise from the need to nonparametrically estimate matching probabilities as a function of all agent characteristics in a matching market. Simultaneously with this paper on identification, I have undertaken two empirical applications of the estimator. In Fox and Bajari (2009) , we study matching between bidders and licenses for sale in a FCC spectrum auction. In Fox (2009) , I study matching between automotive parts suppliers and automotive assemblers. In both cases, the datasets are fairly large and complementarities between multiple matches for the same agent are essential aspects of the empirical investigation. Also, the various types of characteristics (agent, match and group of matches) are all used in the empirical work. So the generality this paper strives for is used in my empirical applications. More recently, Akkus and Hortacsu (2007) , Baccara et al. (2009) , Levine (2008) , Mindruta (2009), and Yang, Shi and Goldfarb (2009) have conducted empirical work using the matching maximum score estimator in Fox (2009) . The identification results here are directly relevant for the above empirical papers.
No paper has performed a fully nonparametric analysis of any sort of matching game. Choo and Siow (2006) provide a logit-based estimator for one-to-one matching games using infinite numbers of agents and a finite number of observed agent characteristics. 1 They identify production functions conditional on the parametric structure of the logit model for the error terms. In Fox and Bajari (2009) , I present a rank order property for many-to-one matching games using infinite numbers of agents and a continuum of observed agent characteristics. I argue that the rank order property in Fox and Bajari (2009) is implied by the logit assumptions in Choo and Siow. Once the rank order property is established, the fully nonparametric identification results in this paper extend almost trivially to the case with an infinite number of agents. Therefore, the assumption of logit errors in Choo and Siow is sufficient but not necessary to identify features of production functions in markets with an infinite number of agents. A literature has explored parametric estimation in the non-nested Gale and Shapley (1962) matching games, i.e. games without endogenous transfers (Boyd et al., 2003; Gordon and Knight, 2009; Sørensen, 2007) . These papers do not study identification.
The results in this paper are relevant for empirical work. One goal of matching empirical work is to distinguish the role of the distribution of exogenous agent characteristics from the role of the production function in the sorting pattern we see in the data. For example, Choo and Siow (2006) find changes in the sorting patterns between broad types of men and women across decades in the United States, and in part ask whether changes in match production functions or changes in agent characteristics are behind the differences in sorting patterns.
Identification of production functions, or features of them, is thus important to answer these questions.
The identification results in this paper are specifically referenced in Fox and Bajari (2009) . In that paper, we estimate the production function for companies matching to geographic mobile phone licenses in a FCC spectrum auction using qualitative data on which bidders win what packages of licenses. We use our estimates to measure the efficiency of the assignment in the auction. The current paper does not prove that the production 1 Dagsvik (2000) also uses the logit model. function is identified up to an affine transformation. Such a theorem would be sufficient to identify the relative efficiency of multiple assignments nonparametrically. In Fox and Bajari, we first use the derivative-based identification arguments to cardinally measure the relative complementarities from higher-value bidders sorting to packages with greater scale and from packages of geographically nearby licenses being grouped together.
Second, we use the results on the identification of production functions up to a positive monotonic transformation to argue that both of these types of bidder and license characteristics are "goods" that raise output. Given a parametric functional form that, informally, is specified up to the features of the production function that I prove are nonparametrically identified, this lets us use our production function to measure (up to scale) the total output from counterfactual assignments of bidders to licenses and to measure how much efficiency is lost from the actual assignment in the auction.
I first present the intuition for the identification strategies and results for the simple example of marriage, in Section 2. Once the intuition for the results has been presented, Section 3 introduces notation for many-tomany, two-sided matching games. Section 4 presents sufficient conditions for the maximum score-like rank order property. The last two sections present the main identification theorems. Section 5 discusses derivativebased identification and Section 6 discusses the identification of production levels up to positive monotonic transformations. The proofs of the theorems are in the appendix.
2 One-to-One, Two-Sided Matching Games
This section presents informal results for the case of one-to-one, two-sided matching. One-to-one matching was studied in Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) , Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973) and has been summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Chapter 8) . The results in this section focus on intuition; there will be no formal proofs. The formal details will be shown for the many-to-many matching case in Sections 5 and 6.
Utility Functions, Production Functions and Transfers
This section studies a market with two men, m 1 and m 2 , and two women, w 1 and w 2 . Each agent has two observable characteristics: schooling and wealth. To simplify notation in this section, let agents be identified by their characteristics. So in a duplication of notation, m 1 = m 1 1 , m 2 2 , where the vector of man m 1 's characteristics is equal to man m 1 's schooling m 1 1 and wealth m 2 1 . Superscripts refer to individual, scalar characteristics and subscripts refer to different agents. For woman w 1 , w 1 = w 1 1 , w 2 1 . The restriction to two men and two women (or equal numbers of men and women) is for expositional convenience; the restriction will not be present in the general results on many-to-many matching games.
Each person can be married only once, to a person of the opposite sex. Let the utility of a man m for a woman w before transfers be v men (m, w), which is a function of the characteristics of m and w, rather than their indices directly. Likewise, let the utility of woman w for man m before transfers be v women (m, w). After a scalar equilibrium transfer t m,w for match m, w is made, the utilities of the man and woman are v men (m, w) + t m,w and v women (m, w) − t m,w , respectively. Transfers can be negative, so the convention that women pay men is an innocuous normalization. Being single is allowed. If man m is unmatched, write his utility as v men (m, 0) + 0, where we say he is matched to a dummy agent 0. Women can also be single.
A key object of interest in this paper is the production from a match,
which is a function of the schooling of the man and woman and the wealth of both. This paper seeks to identify features of the production function f (m, w) and not the utility functions v men (m, w) and v women (m, w) separately. This is because, absent using the individual rationality decision to remain single, the production function f (m, w) will govern the sorting pattern in the transferable utility matching games studied here. One can only identify features of the production function f (m, w) in part because production is not directly observed in the data; only matches are.
Becker (1973) shows that if each man and each woman has only one characteristic, say schooling but not wealth, then, in a pairwise stable equilibrium, men and women will assortatively match if the schooling of men and women are complements in production
Assortative matching means highly-schooled men match with highly-schooled women. Likewise, anti-assortative matching occurs if schooling levels of men and women are substitutes in production. My setup is already more general: each agent has a vector of characteristics m = m 1 , m 2 . Becker's result does not apply to this case. No previous matching theory paper provides an analytical characterization of the equilibrium sorting pattern using simple production function properties such as complementarities when agents have vectors of characteristics and the exogenous distribution of agent characteristics is unrestricted.
Data on Multiple Matching Markets
The econometrician has access to data on (A, X) with X = (m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) for each member of a population of matching markets. Think of each market as a very small town with two men and two women; the researcher observes their characteristics X. Likewise, the researcher observes the assignment A, the set of matches, in each market. For example, if m 1 and w 1 as well as m 2 and w 2 marry, A = { m 1 , w 1 , m 2 , w 2 }, where m 1 , w 1 is the match between man m 1 and woman w 1 . If m 2 and w 2 are instead single,
Readers may be familiar with single agent, discrete choice models, such as the parametric logit model or the semiparametric maximum score model. It might be helpful to think of matching by analogy to single agent choice: the independent variables are the agent characteristics X = (m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) and the qualitative dependent variable is the assignment A. Of course, the underlying data generating process for A is an equilibrium model and not a single agent choice model.
Assume that all characteristics in X vary across markets and are continuous random variables with (if needed) full support. Let the support be a product space across all eight characteristics (recall each of the four agents has two characteristics), so that there is some matching market with each combination of the eight characteristics. The researcher has access to the population data on i.i.d. market observations (A, X) and hence can identify the joint distribution of A and X. Let Pr (A | X) be the probability of observing assignment A given agent characteristics X. Pr (A | X) is known given the joint distribution of A and X, as is G (X), the marginal distribution of X.
For the case of one-to-one matching (this property will not always generalize to many-to-many matching), Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) , Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973) prove that any pairwise stable assignment A will maximize the sum of production of all matches in the economy, or A will maximize ∑ m,w ∈A f (m, w), where m, w is an arbitrary match in the feasible assignment A. An assignment is feasible for marriage if each agent has at most one spouse and the spouse is of the opposite gender.
Let S index the stochastic structure of the model. If the matching market has error terms ψ, S will be the distribution of the error terms. Given a production function f and stochastic structure S and the assumption of independence between X and ψ, the model induces a probability distribution over assignments A given observed agent characteristics X,
This formulation requires that the assignment chosen (or the assignment that is pairwise stable) is unique with probability 1, which holds in the one-to-one matching model if agent characteristics or error terms have continuous and product supports. If f 0 is the true production function and S 0 is the true stochastic structure, then the observed data are generated as Pr (A | X) = Pr A | X; f 0 , S 0 .
The Rank Order Property
Identification will be based upon what I call the rank order property. The rank order property defines the econometric model being studied. The property is inspired by related conditions in the literature on maximum score estimation of the single agent, multinomial choice model (Manski, 1975; Matzkin, 1993; Fox, 2007) . Let A 1 and A 2 be two different feasible assignments for the same matching market.
Property 2.1. Given f and S, a strong version of the rank order property states that Pr
For example, focus on the two assignments where no agent is single. Let A 1 = { m 1 , w 1 , m 2 , w 2 } and
Given observable agent characteristics in X and the true f 0 , the rank order property states that assignment A 1 is more frequently observed if and only if
For marriage, the rank order property is a stochastic extension of the deterministic idea from the theory literature that the equilibrium assignment maximizes production and assignments that do not maximize production do not occur. Under the rank order property, all assignments can occur, and their frequencies are rank ordered by their sums of deterministic production.
The rank order property holds exactly if the total production to an assignment A is ∑ m,w ∈A f (m, w) + ψ A , where ψ A independently and identically distributed across assignments A (or exchangeable across A). The error ψ A occurs in the social planner's problem, and can be thought of a market equilibrating error (a friction). One might decompose ψ A = ∑ m,w ∈A ε m,w ,A , where ε m,w ,A is specific to match m, w and assignment A, but these errors enter the social planning problem only and should not be seen as unobserved heterogeneity in the payoff to each match.
The rank order property holds approximately in simulations if the payoff to a match is f (m, w)+ε m,w , where ε m,w is independently and identically distributed across matches m, w and reflects unobserved heterogeneity in the payoff to a match observed by the agents in the matching game. This type of i.i.d. error is typically invoked on the literature on estimating static Nash games. Section 4 presents the relevant simulation evidence.
The rank order property is unlikely to hold if the production to a match is f m 1 , m 2 , η man , w 1 , w 2 , η woman , where η man is a scalar unobserved characteristic of a man and η woman is a scalar unobserved characteristic of a woman, and both unobservables are i.i.d. None of the previous papers on parametric estimation in any sort of matching game allow these sorts of unobserved agent characteristics that enter the production of every match involving agents m or w (Boyd et al., 2003; Choo and Siow, 2006; Sørensen, 2007) . As the first paper on identification in any sort of matching game, I stick to the simple rank order property and do not explore identification in the presence of unobserved characteristics η man and η woman . Such an extension is a subject of my ongoing research, which is important because empirical papers that do not formally estimate an equilibrium matching model, such as Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), have found that such characteristics may be important.
The rank order property is convenient because it allows identification and estimation to proceed without solving integrals. Simulation arguments directly involve the integral in (1), so could involve numerically integrating out error terms equal to the number of men times the number of women, if the payoff to a match is f (m, w) + ε m,w . This could involve hundreds of agents and thousands of error terms in a realistic dataset.
The identification arguments in this paper lead to the computationally simple maximum score estimator in Fox (2009).
Identification of Features of and Within Classes of Production Functions
As I wrote above, qualitative data on who matches with whom in equilibrium will not be enough to identify production functions in full generality. At a minimum, multiplying each f by a positive constant will preserve the inequality in (2).
There are two ways I proceed over the two classes of identification results that I will present: identifying features c ( f ) of the production function f and sufficiently restricting the class of production functions F so that f 0 is point identified within it. I use an extension of a standard definition for point identification by Gourieroux and Monfort (1995, Section 3.4) . The probability of a set of market characteristics Y is Y dG (X).
Definition 2.1. Let F be a class of production functions and S a class of stochastic structures. Let f 0 ∈ F be the production function and let S 0 ∈ S be the stochastic structure in the data generating process.
1. f 0 is identified within the class of production functions F if there does not exist
stochastic structure S 1 ∈ S , and some possibly empty set Y of market characteristics of probability 0
2. Let c (·) be a known function of f that produces either a scalar, vector, another function of the arguments of f , or a vector of functions of the arguments of f . A feature of f 0 c f 0 is identified for the class of production functions F if there does not exist f 1 ∈ F where c f 1 = c f 0 , stochastic structure S 1 ∈ S , and some possibly empty set Y of market characteristics of probability 0 such that Pr A | X; f 1 ,
Let me provide a template for how we can combine the definition of identification and the rank order property to show identification of a feature c f 0 of f 0 , the true production function. Therefore, let f 1 be some other production function such that c f 1 = c f 0 . Identification will require us to find a set of market characteristics X where (2) holds for f = f 0 and
holds
happened to generate the data, which it does not. Pr
possibilities. Under an assumption of the continuity of the production function, the feature of the production function c f 0 is identified if for any f 1 = f 0 we can find a set of market observables X = (m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) where (2) holds for f = f 0 and (3) holds for f = f 1 . An open set of market characteristics around this particular X will be decisive because f 0 and f 1 give different implications for the population data Pr (A | X) for all X in the open set.
Derivative-Based Identification
I will use the notion of a feature c ( f ) to identify cross-partial derivatives or ratios of cross-partial derivatives.
Are Two Inputs Complements or Substitutes at a Point?
The first feature of f 0 that that will be identifiable is the sign of
∂ m 1 ∂ w 1 , or whether the schooling levels of men and women are complements or substitutes in production. Here m and w should be take as any arbitrary vectors of male and female characteristics. This extends the informal identification result of Becker (1973) in two ways: each m is a vector of two characteristics schooling and wealth, not just schooling, and the signs of ∂ 2 f 0 (m,w) ∂ m 1 ∂ w 1 can be positive for some couple characteristics (m, w) and negative for other (m, w) . The sign of
∂ m 1 ∂ w 1 will be learned for each (m, w) separately, and so the signs will be known for all points of the support of f .
∂ m 1 ∂ w 1 > 0 and so, to show identification, let f 1 be some other production function where
We will need to find some characteristics X = (m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 ), eight characteristics as each element is a vector, where (2) holds for f = f 0 and (3) holds for f = f 1 .
In what follows, assume each f is three-times differentiable, so that cross-partial derivatives are symmetric.
Then a cross-partial derivative can be expressed as the limit of a middle-difference quotient:
where h is the limit argument. The value of (m, w) where we wish to identify the sign of
The numerator of the middle-difference quotient in (4) for f = f 0 will be positive for sufficiently small h,
Likewise for sufficiently small h > 0, the numerator of the middle-difference quotient in (4) for f = f 1 will be negative. Let h be sufficiently small so that both the previous statements hold. For f = f 0 , we can rearrange the positive numerator to give
Likewise, the opposite inequality will hold for f = f 1 . Now let there be two hypothetical assignments,
and
By the rank order property, f 0 implies Pr (A 1 | X) > Pr (A 2 | X) and f 1 implies the reverse. We thus have identification of f 0 and hence we learn the sign of
We can use data on the equilibrium outcomes to matching markets to learn whether two inputs are complements or substitutes in production.
What is the economic intuition? Given the true f 0 and the alternative f 1 , we were able to find a set of matching market observables X where f 0 and f 1 gave different predictions about the relative frequencies of two assignments. Here, f 0 predicted that, in markets with this X, agents would assortatively match on schooling (A 1 ) in more markets than they would anti-assortatively match (A 2 ), while f 1 predicted anti-assortative matching would occur in more markets. We can look at the population data on Pr (A | X) to see which is more common. The continuity of f will extend this identification to an open set of market characteristics with positive probability.
Note that this result does not allow a researcher to tell whether a pair of inputs are "more" complementary at (m 1 , w 1 ) than some other point (m 2 , w 2 ). For example,
∂ m 1 ∂ w 1 = 7 cannot be distinguished from any other pair of positive values.
How Important Are Complementarities For One Pair of Inputs Compared to Another Pair?
A natural question to ask is how much more important are complementarities between schooling levels of men and women compared to complementarities between wealth levels of men and women? The multivariate model has multiple characteristics and we wish to identify the relative importance of the different pairs of characteristics in match production.
Say both schooling and wealth are complements:
∂ m 2 ∂ w 2 > 0. We will identify the ratio of the complementarities of schooling to the complementarities of wealth, or
As before, the analysis is local: for a given value of the vectors of male and female characteristics (m, w). We can establish these ratios globally by varying (m, w) . Also note that we are identifying the ratio of complementarities, which is an actual numerical value. This will be harder than identifying whether
∂ m 2 ∂ w 2 , which is a qualitative comparison instead of a quantitative value. 2 Let f 1 = f 0 be some other production function. Because we can use the previous arguments to identify whether any pair of inputs are complements or substitutes, we can restrict attention to the case where
∂ m 2 ∂ w 2 may seem parallel to the identification of marginal rates of substitution in single agent choice. The ratio of marginal utilities is preserved under positive monotonic transformations. However, the ratio of cross-partial derivatives is not preserved under positive monotonic transformations. 0 and
∂ m 2 ∂ w 2 > 0 but, without loss of generality,
We will need to embellish the running example and allow each matching market to have three men and three women. Let all men start at the baseline characteristics m 1 , m 2 . One man m 1 + h 1 , m 2 has h 1 extra units of schooling and another man m 1 , m 2 + h 2 has h 2 extra units of wealth. Likewise, there are three women, w 1 , w 2 ,
The formal argument using the limits of middle-difference quotients is somewhat technical and will appear in the proof to Theorem 5.3 for the many-to-many matching case. For now, this omitted argument will give particular values of h 1 and h 2 , the extra schooling and the extra wealth, where key inequalities hold. In particular, under f = f 0 and these choices of h 1 and h 2 ,
Meanwhile, under f = f 1 the reverse inequality will hold. On the left side, there is the total production from an
where the man and woman with h 1 extra units of schooling marry. Also, the man and woman with h 2 extra units of wealth each marry baseline individuals. On the right side, there is the total production from an assignment
where the couple where both have h 2 of extra wealth marry but the man and woman with h 1 of extra schooling each marry a baseline person.
We have found a set of observable characteristics X and two corresponding assignments A 1 and A 2 where f 0 and f 1 give different implications for the comparison of total, deterministic production. So f 0 implies
and f 1 implies the reverse. The economic intuition is easy to understand. Assignment A 1 has assortative matching on schooling but anti-assortative matching on wealth and A 2 has assortative matching on wealth but anti-assortative matching on schooling. If, at these choices for X, assortative matching on schooling and anti-assortative matching on wealth occur in more markets than assortative matching on wealth and anti-assortative matching on schooling, then the true ratio of complementarities is
∂ m 2 ∂ w 2 is identified because f 1 was arbitrary.
Identification of Production Functions Up to Positive Monotonic Transformations
The derivative-based identification analysis is sufficient for many matching empirical applications. However, it is impossible to use the derivative-based analysis to tell apart two production functions with the same crosspartial derivatives. Briefly let schooling be only the agent characteristic. The production functions f 1 m 1 , w 1 = − m 1 − w 1 2 and f 2 m 1 , w 1 = 2m 1 · w 1 both have
Under f 1 , each man's marriage's production is highest when the man matches with a woman with the same level of schooling. Schooling is a horizontal attribute. Under f 2 , any man's marriage's production will be maximized by matching with the most-educated woman. Schooling is a vertical attribute. Now return to there being two characteristics, wealth and schooling, for each man and each woman. Identifying cross-partial derivatives does not tell us whether production is higher at one argument (m, w) than another argument. For any two sets of characteristics for a pair of matches m 1 , w 1 and m 2 , w 2 , we need to identify whether f 0 (m 1 , w 1 ) > f 0 (m 2 , w 2 ) or the reverse. Ordering production function levels is helpful in distinguishing whether an individual match characteristic such as schooling is actually a vertical attribute that raises output.
Matzkin (1993, Theorem 1) proves the identification of utility functions for the single agent, multinomial choice model. Matzkin shows that production functions are identified within a class U of functions where no two utility functions are related by a positive monotonic transformation. Formally, Matzkin finds identification of the utility function in part by sufficiently restricting the class of utility functions to rule out positive monotonic transformations. Following Matzkin, restrict attention to a class of production functions F where no two members are related by a positive monotonic transformation. Let f 0 ∈ F be the true production function and f 1 ∈ F some alternative not related to f 0 by a positive monotonic transformation. Matzkin proves there exists two points (m 1 , w 1 ) and (m 2 , w 2 ) where, without loss of generality, f 0 (m 1 , w 1 ) > f 0 (m 2 , w 2 ) and
For the single agent model, identification is then proved using a rank order property: a consumer with utility function f 0 picks the product with characteristics (m 1 , w 1 ) more frequently than the product with characteristics (m 2 , w 2 ). A consumer with utility function f 1 does the reverse. Data on the frequency of choice will show f 1 is not the correct utility function.
In the single agent model, one can vary the characteristics of the choices facing the single agent. In a matching market, an agent must pay the appropriate transfer to match with a partner, and that transfer is both an outcome of the game and assumed to not be in the data. Therefore, I extend the mathematical arguments in Matzkin to show the identification of the production function f by using only exogenous information on X, the collection of characteristics of all agents and potential matches in a matching market. In other words, I
work with the equilibrium structure of the game and variation in the exogenous market-level characteristics of matches to show identification.
We need to transform the inequality f 0 (m 1 , w 1 ) > f 0 (m 2 , w 2 ) into an inequality that compares assignments A 1 and A 2 for the same market with observable characteristics X. The problem is that agents with different characteristics appear on the left and right sides of f 0 (m 1 , w 1 ) > f 0 (m 2 , w 2 ). Focusing on single people will resolve this dilemma. Adding the payoff for each agent being single to each side of the inequality gives
This inequality almost involves two assignments to the same market, X. An issue is that a man with characteristics m 1 appears on the left side twice, as does a woman w 1 . Similarly, man w 1 and woman w 2 appear twice on the right side. One commonly-used assumption in the theory literature, for example Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1972) , is that the payoff to being single is 0. If this is the case, we can choose to set the production of certain unmarried agents in (5) to 0, giving
We could set all single matches to 0, but doing so would return us to
On the left side, we have an assignment A 1 = { m 1 , w 1 , m 2 , 0 , 0, w 2 } and on the right side we have an assignment
and f 1 implies the reverse, for X = (m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 ). By the continuity of f , there will be a set of X with positive probability where the assignment probabilities for A 1 and A 2 are differently ordered by the true f 0 and the alternative f 1 . Thus, f 0 is identified in the class F , where F contains no two production functions that are related by a positive monotonic transformation.
The economic intuition here is simple. If we wish to know whether or not f 0 (m 1 , w 1 ) > f 0 (m 2 , w 2 ), we merely need to see the relative frequency of m 1 and w 1 being married and m 2 and w 2 being single (A 1 ) compared to m 2 and w 2 being married and m 1 and w 1 being single (A 2 ). The couple with the higher marital production will be single less often.
Observations on single people are often found in marriage data. The need to use single people arises because the example used agent-specific characteristics. Identification of production functions up to a positive monotonic transformation will be proved below for match-specific and group-of-matches-specific characteristics. Those results will not rely on single people.
The results on identification of cross-partial derivatives and the results on identification of production func- 
Many-to-Many Matching Games
The rest of the paper studies the general case of many-to-many matching games without additive separability in an upstream firm's payoffs across multiple downstream firm partners. These interactions in payoffs across partners are the key behind many empirical issues, as my empirical work elsewhere has illustrated (Fox and Bajari, 2009; Fox, 2009 ). This section outlines a two-sided, many-to-many matching game where all match characteristics are observable to other firms. In the next section, I reintroduce the rank order property and discuss sufficient conditions on error terms. The running example will be downstream firms matching with upstream firms. Some theoretical results on one-to-one, two-sided matching with transferable utility have been generalized by Kelso and Crawford (1982) for one-to-many matching, Leonard (1983) and Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) for multiple-unit auctions, as well as Sotomayor (1992) , Camiña (2006) and Jaume, Massó and Neme (2008) for many-to-many matching with additive separability in payoffs across multiple matches.
These models are applications of general equilibrium theory to games with typically finite numbers of agents.
The identification strategy used in this paper can be extended to the cases studied by Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003) for one-sided matching, Ostrovsky (2008) for supply chain, multi-sided matching, and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) for the one-sided matching of workers into coalitions known as firms with hierarchical production. This paper uses the term "matching game" to encompass a broad class of transferable utility models, including some games where the original theoretical analyses used different names.
Many-to-Many Matching Markets
Notationally, I drop the equivalence between agent indices and their characteristics because I will allow for all of firm-, match-and group-specific characteristics.
Several exogenous objects define a matching market. Let U be a finite set of upstream firms, indexed by u. Let D be a finite set of downstream firms, indexed by d. Let Q : U ∪ D → N + be the set of quotas, where
∈ Q is the quota of a downstream firm d and q up u ∈ Q is the quota of the upstream firm u. A quota represents the maximum number of physical matches that a firm can have. Let X be the collection of all payoff-relevant exogenous characteristics. I will be specific about the elements of X below. A matching market also has the exogenous preferences of agents, which I will also discuss below.
Let u, d be a match between downstream firm u and upstream firm d. As before, 0, d refers to an unfilled quota slot for a downstream firm and u, 0 refers to an unfilled quota slot for an upstream firm. The space of individual matches is (U ∪ {0}) × (D ∪ {0}). A matching-market outcome is a tuple (A, T ). An assignment A, or a finite collection of matches for all agents in the market, is an element of the power set of (U ∪ {0}) × (D ∪ {0}).
For any assignment
a set of transfers for all matches in A. Each t u,d ∈ R and represents a payment by a downstream firm to an upstream firm. I use the convention that the downstream firm is sending positive transfers to the upstream firm; the notation allows transfers to be negative. In a market with 100 upstream-downstream relationships, A is a set of 100 relationships and T is a set of 100 transfers between each of the matched partners. The combination of the exogenous (D,U, Q, X) and endogenous (A, T ) elements of a matching market is the tuple (D,U, Q, X, A, T ).
Given an outcome (A, T ), the payoff of u ∈ U is
Here, the function D u (A) gives the collection of downstream firms u is matched to in assignment A,
is the structural revenue function for upstream firms, and x (u, D u ) is the vector of characteristics entering the production function for the matches involving upstream firm u and an arbitrary collection of downstream
assume that the structural revenues of downstream firms are additively separable across multiple upstream firm
is a collection of upstream firms. The reason for assuming additive separability in downstream firms' payoffs across multiple upstream firms will be clear when I reintroduce production functions below.
I will consider three types of characteristics. First consider the case studied in Section 2, where each agent 3 I use the vector notation only for characteristics in part to reserve x for an element of x. 
I also consider cases where covariates vary directly at the match u, d or group-of-matches D u levels. If all characteristic are match-specific, the long vector
is the vector of characteristics of the match u, d . An example of an element of x match u,d is a measure of whether two firms' inventory information systems are compatible. For group-specific characteristics, the
is not a concatenation of shorter vectors for covariates that operate at the match u, D u
level. An example of group-specific characteristics is that x group u,D u might include the percentage of upstream firm u's downstream firm partners that are located in countries with rigorous environmental regulations.
X is the tuple of vectors of characteristics for all firms for firm-specific characteristics, all potential matches for match-specific characteristics, and all potential groups of matches in a market, whether the matches are part of a particular assignment or not. Formally,
where P (D ∪ {0}) is the power set of downstream firms. All elements of X may not be present in many applications. For example, an application may lack match-specific characteristics. In that case, just treat the corresponding terms as not being present in the definition of X. 5
The fact that transfers enter total profits additively separably for both upstream and downstream firms allows us to focus on the following production function.
For the Section 2 example of one-to-one matching with fixed types,
I assume that the maximum quota for all upstream firms, max u∈U q up u , is known and finite. This means that x (u, D u ) has a known maximum number of elements. For many-to-many matching, a maximum quota and the additive separability of v down ( x (u, {d})) across multiple upstream firm partners makes the set of arguments of f finite. 6 Additive separability for one side of the market is restrictive. Unfortunately, I know of no other way to define a production function without relying on parametric assumptions. In an empirical application, a researcher might be wiling to make parametric assumptions and choose a functional form for f so that nonlinearities in an upstream firm's profits across its downstream firm partners are distinguished from a downstream firm's nonlinearities across its upstream firm partners. 4 The concatenation operator makes one long vector out of a set of shorter vectors. I use the concatenation operator because discussing the properties of a production function using familiar ideas from the econometrics literature will be easier if a production function takes a single vector of arguments, rather than a number of distinct vectors, as arguments. 5 This definition of X does not require knowledge of quotas Q, which will later be said to be unmeasured. However, if quotas are known, the researcher can disregard including in X any x group u,Du for a |D u | > q up u . The definition of X requires dummy arguments for characteristics involving the partner of being unmatched, 0, for notational conciseness later. 6 Consider an example with matches u 1 , d 1 , u 1 , d 2 and u 2 , d 2 . If the model allowed arbitrary nonlinearities in both upstream and downstream firms' structural revenue functions, there would be a set of firms
, even though u 1 and u 2 , u 2 and d 1 as well as d 1 and d 2 have no direct links. Sometimes I will view f (·) as an abstract function to be identified and estimated. In this case, I write f ( x), where the argument x is an arbitrary vector of characteristics. When an upstream firm does not use all of its quota, null arguments can be included in the argument vector x of f ( x) to refer to the unfilled match slots.
Pairwise Stability
Because binding quotas prevent an agent from unilaterally adding a new partner without dropping an old one, the equilibrium concept in matching games allows an agent to consider exchanging a partner. I use the innocuous convention that upstream firms pick downstream firms. Definition 3.2. A feasible outcome (A, T ) is a pairwise stable equilibrium when:
Properties of Pairwise Stable Outcomes in Many-to-Many Matching Games
The literature has established existence and uniqueness results for pairwise stable equilibria (A, T ) under a restriction on the upstream firm preferences v up ( x (u, D u )) known as substitutes. Substitutes restricts how one upstream firm ranks sets of downstream firms. 7 In the interests of brevity, I refer the interested reader to Definitions 5 and 6 in Hatfield and Kominers (2010) for this restriction expressed in a more general matching game in contract space. Hatfield and Kominers show several results (some are implied by more general results). Under substitutable preferences, a pairwise stable equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Further, any pairwise stable equilibrium is automatically also fully stable. A fully stable equilibrium is robust to deviations by any coalition of downstream and upstream firms. One such coalition is the coalition of all firms. Because of this paper's focus on transferable utility, an assignment that is part of fully stable equilibrium outcome will then maximize the sum of production in the entire matching economy. Indeed, the equilibrium assignment will be computable by a sufficiently general social planner's linear programming problem. Further, if the characteristics enter the production function have continuous support and the production function is continuous in its arguments, then a unique assignment A will solve the social planner's linear programming problem and hence be part of any pairwise stable equilibrium (A, T ) with probability 1. To summarize, the substitutes condition ensures existence of a pairwise stable assignment and the uniqueness of that assignment with probability 1, in a many-to-many, transferable utility matching game. The substitutes condition also leads to a useful algorithm for computing equilibrium assignments. If preferences allow for complementarities between multiple downstream firms matched to the same upstream firm, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) , Pycia (2008) , Hatfield and Kojima (2008) and Hatfield and Kominers (2010) present examples of preferences where no pairwise stable equilibrium exists. The counterexamples mean that general existence theorems do not exist. However, recent empirical and theoretical work on nontransferable utility matching games has presented situations under which the probability that a pairwise stable equilibrium exists converges to 1 as the number of agents in the matching market grows large (Kojima, Pathak and Roth, 2010) . In this sense, non-existence of pairwise stable equilibria may be a minor problem in some markets of empirical interest. This paper will maintain the assumption that the data reflect a pairwise stable equilibrium. 8
Under complementarities, there is no equivalence of pairwise and fully stable equilibria, so pairwise stable equilibria will not solve a social planner's problem. Pairwise stable equilibria can be inefficient. The latter property means multiple equilibrium assignments can exist with positive probability. I discuss multiple equilibrium assignments in Section 4.5.
7 Note that in this context "substitutes" here refers to how multiple downstream firms enter preferences, not how different individual firm characteristics enter production functions. The latter use is the more common use of "substitutes" and "complements" in this article. 8 Other researchers have examined games with potential existence issues. In the non-nested-with-matching literature on estimating normal-form Nash games, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) throw out a particular realization of the error term's contribution to the likelihood if no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In the current paper, probabilities will not sum to 1 if equilibria sometimes do not exist. In computational experiments, I rarely stumble across parameters where no pairwise stable outcome exists.
Using Matches Only: Local Production Maximization
A matching-game outcome (A, T ) has two components. I consider using data on only A. This is because researchers often lack data on transfers, even when the agents use transfers. Upstream and downstream firms exchange money, but the transfer values are private, contractual details that are not released to researchers.
I will exploit the transferable utility structure of the game to derive an inequality that involves A but not T .
For upstream firms u 1 and u 2 , consider an example where D u 1 (A) = {d 1 } and D u 2 (A) = {d 2 }. The inequality (8)
after substituting in the definition oft u 1 ,d 2 . Likewise, there is another inequality for u 2 's deviation to match
Adding (9) and (10), cancelling the transfers t u 1 ,d 1 and t u 2 ,d 2 that now are the same on both sides of the inequality, and substituting the definition of a production function, Definition 3.1, creates the new inequality
This is a local production maximization inequality: "local" because only exchanges of one downstream firm per upstream firm are considered, and "production maximization" because the implication of pairwise stability says that the total output from two matches must exceed the output from two matches formed from an exchange of partners.
The local production maximization inequality suggests that interactions between the characteristics of agents in production functions drive the equilibrium pattern of sorting in a market. As the same set of firms appears on both sides of the inequality, terms that do not involve interactions between the characteristics of firms difference out. In a one-to-one matching game, if
β down for parameter vectors β up and β down , then a local production maximization inequality is
or 0 ≥ 0, so the definition has no empirical content. Theoretically, the uninteracted characteristics are valued equally by all potential partner firms and are priced out in equilibrium. 9
More generally, the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability can be used to form a local production maximization inequality.
Lemma 3.3. Given a pairwise stable outcome (A, T ), let B 1 ⊆ A, let π be a permutation of the downstream firm partners in B 1 , and let
Then the inequality
holds.
All proofs are found in the appendix. 10 The definition of a local production maximization inequality is similar to (12), except that no particular outcome (A, T ) needs to be stated. This definition will be used formally in the identification proofs.
Definition 3.4. Let there be a set of matches B 1 and let B 2 be a permutation π of B 1 ,
For each u where u, d ∈ B 1 , let there be a set of downstream firms
a local production maximization inequality. 11
The definition of pairwise stability is powerful: the condition that no upstream firm wants to swap a single downstream firm partner for a single new partner at the equilibrium transfers implies local production maximization inequalities involving large sets of matches B 1 and B 2 . The potential large size of B 1 and B 2 in the lemma will be important for some of the nonparametric identification theorems below. 12 4 The Rank Order Property
Data on Many Independent Matching Markets
I will consider identification using data on the population of different matching markets. As before, a matching market is described by (D,U, Q, X, A, T ). Data on the transfers T are often not available. Similarly, quotas, Q, are often an abstraction of the matching model and are usually not found in datasets on upstream and downstream firms. Therefore, I will explore identification using data on (D,U, X, A). From now on, I subsume D and U into X in order to use more concise notation. The researcher then observes (A, X) across markets. 13 With data on the population of statistically independent and identically distributed as well as economically unrelated matching markets, the researcher is able to identify Pr (A | X), the probability of observing assignment A given that the market has characteristics X, as defined previously. To ensure that the model gives full support to the data, I wish that Pr (A | X) > 0 for any physically feasible (matches of each agent under that agent's quota) assignment A. 14 The probability Pr (A | X) will be induced by a stochastic structure S. Then
where Pr A | X, Q; f 0 , S 0 is the probability of an assignment A being observed given the exogenous characteristics X, the exogenous quotas Q, the true match production function f 0 , and the true stochastic structure S 0 . The functions f 0 and S 0 are unknown to the econometrician and are arguments to the endogenous-variable data generating process Pr A | X, Q; f 0 , S 0 , but they are fixed across markets and are not random variables. The matching model and any equilibrium-assignment selection rule together induce the distribution Pr A | X, Q; f 0 , S 0 . I will discuss primitive formulations of error terms in detail below. The quotas in Q are unmeasured, so the econometrician observes data on Pr A | X; f 0 , S 0 ≡ E Q|X Pr A | X, Q; f 0 , S 0 , where the expectation over Q is taken with respect to its distribution conditional on X. 15
The Rank Order Property
I will rely on a rank order property to add econometric randomness to the matching outcomes. 16 I first describe a non-primitive rank order property for matching games. In Section 2, this was related to production maximization in the entire economy. The general model allows many-to-many matching, where pairwise stability does not give a link to economy-wide production, efficiency. The rank order property can be seen as a stochastic version of local production maximization. The benefits of the rank order property were given in the introduction.
Property 4.1. Let A 1 be a feasible assignment for a market with characteristics X. Let B 1 ⊆ A 1 and let π be a permutation of the downstream firm partners in B 1 , giving
Let S ∈ S be any distribution of the error terms and let f ∈ F be any production function. The rank order property states that
if and only if
Keep in mind that X, f and S are held fixed: the rank order property is an assumption about the stochastic structure of the model. To understand the rank order property, consider a situation where A 1 contains thousands of matches and
Given X and Q, neither A 1 or A 2 may be a stable assignment to the matching model without error terms. But A 1 might dominate A 2 in the deterministic model in that at least two agents in B 2 would prefer to match with each other instead of their assigned partners, leading to A 1 .
More generally, if the local production maximization inequality (13) is satisfied, then some agents in B 1 want 14 This focus on allowing errors to affect the realization of A distinguishes this paper's approach to matching games from the work on estimating Nash games by Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006), which does not allow for these errors in general normal-form Nash games and so, except in a few cases such as ordered choice, does imply the analog to Pr (A | X) = 0 for some physically possible A's.
15 The transfers T do not need to be integrated out because T is a separate endogenous outcome from A. 16 In single agent discrete choice problems with the payoff structure x a,i β + ε a,i for agent i and choice a, S represents the distribution of error terms ε a,i . S is not identified under the standard (rank order property) conditions for the identification of β in either binary choice or multinomial choice (Manski, 1975 (Manski, , 1988 . In matching, I will focus on identifying f and not S.
to deviate in the deterministic matching model. In a model with error terms, both A 1 and A 2 could be pairwise stable assignments to some realizations of the unobserved components in the matching model. The property says that A 1 will be more likely to be a pairwise stable assignment to some realized model than A 2 . 17 As the quotas in Q are not observed in many empirical applications, a slightly more primitive version of Property 4.1 is that (13) holds if and only if Pr (A 1 | X, Q; f , S) > Pr (A 2 | X, Q; f , S), for any valid Q. Then taking expectations with respect to Q | X gives Assumption 4.1. Even if Q is unobserved, for the most part I have only considered inequalities where the total number of matches of each agent in A 1 and A 2 is kept the same. 18 If unmatched agents are not considered in B 1 and B 2 and if A 1 is a feasible assignment for Q, A 2 is also a feasible assignment for that Q.
A Sufficient Condition for the Rank Order Property
This subsection explores a sufficient condition for the rank order property, Property 4.1, in the context of models where assignments have unobserved components in production. In this subsection only, I impose the condition that the equilibrium (A, T ) satisfies full stability, as discussed in Section 3.3. This ensures that a pairwise stable equilibrium (A, T ) always exists, that the equilibrium assignment A is unique with probability 1 and that the equilibrium assignment A is computable as a social planner's problem. Substitutable preferences is a sufficient condition for these properties.
There is a finite, although potentially large, number of assignments. The social planning problem is a single agent, unordered, discrete choice problem of Manski (1975) , where the single agent is the social planner choosing from the finite (but often large) number of assignments. From Manski's work, we know the sufficient condition that will arise. For an assignment A, let its total production be ∑ u,d ∈A f ( x (u, D u (A))) + ψ A , where ψ A is an unobserved component of the production of assignment A. Let ψ be the vector of all ψ A 's. Let ψ have the density S and let ψ be independent of Q and X. 19 Let Pr (A | Q, X; f , S) be the probability A is picked by the social planner.
Lemma 4.1. Let the payoff to the social planner for assignment A be ∑ u,d ∈A f ( x (u, D u (A))) + ψ A and let the social planner to choose an assignment to maximize its payoff. Let the density S be exchangeable. Then the rank order property, Property 4.1, holds.
This lemma was proved in Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2005) and is a slight generalization of a result in Manski (1975) . 20 The social planner errors can be interpreted as errors in the deterministic model from finding the true stable assignment. One could then view exchangeability of the joint density as a structural assumption on the equilibrium-assignment selection process. Adding errors to a deterministic model is similar to the quantileresponse-equilibrium method of perturbing behavior (Goeree et al.) . The social planning problem is a structural 17 The rank order property can be rejected by the data if the following set is empty: the set of f ∈ F such that
holds for all (A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 , X), where A 1 , A 2 , B 1 and B 2 are defined in Property 4.1 and Pr (A | X) is identified from the data.
18 Unmatched agents 0 could be included in matches in B 1 . For nonparametric identification, data on unmatched agents will not be needed, except for one theorem. 19 There is no need for the density S to be the same for all markets X. See Fox (2007) for more discussion of letting X be a conditioning argument in S in single agent, multinomial choice. 20 An exchangeable joint density satisfies g (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) = g (πy 1 , πy 2 , . . . , πy n ) for any permutation π of any vector of arguments (y 1 , . . . , y n ).
assumption that does exactly generalize the intuition from the empirical matching literature (without error terms) that assignments with, say, more assortative matching are more likely to occur. 21
Match-Specific Error Terms
The closest analog to the practice of adding action-specific error terms to perfect information Nash games in matching games (a non-nested class of games) is adding match-specific error terms ε u,d (Andrews, Berry and Jia, 2004; Bajari, Hong and Ryan, 2009a; Beresteanu, Molchanov and Molinari, 2008; Berry, 1992; Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Galichon and Henry, 2008; Jia, 2008; Mazzeo, 2002; Tamer, 2003) . Let the total output of a set of downstream firm partners D u for upstream firm u be
where ε u,d is the match-u, d -specific error term, which is independent of all components of X and Q. Let the stochastic structure S represent the distribution of ε u,d . Let the game's outcome be fully stable, to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium assignments with probability 1. Then, in the perfect information world where ε u,d
is observed by all agents in the model but is not in the data,
where ε is the vector of error terms for all U · D possible matches as well as the option of being single for each agent. Under this model, S can be chosen so that each physically feasible A will always have positive probability.
For matching, unlike single agent discrete choice, it is not a theorem that i.i.d. errors yield the rank order property for matching, Property 4.1. All models are approximations to reality. If the true production function is thought to include i.i.d. match-specific shocks as in (14) and therefore assignment probabilities are given by (15), then the rank order property may actually be a pretty close approximation. After all, the transferable utility and price taking structure of the game does naturally imply that adding production functions is much more natural than in a noncooperative Nash game. I now present simulation results that examine how closely a perfect information matching game with shocks as in (14) is approximated by the rank order property, a natural generalization of prior work on matching games without econometric errors. Table 1 includes results from simulations that compute assignment probabilities for a one-to-one, twosided matching game where match production is f ( x (u, {d})) + ε u,d . There are three upstream firms and three downstream firms. The details of the game are in the notes to Table 1 . The parameters of the game are chosen so that two assignments A 1 and A 2 give equal probability, neither is the deterministic stable assignment, 21 An exchangeable joint density for assignment-level errors is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the rank order property. Consider the comparison of an assignment A 1 = { 1, 1 , 2, 2 , 3, 0 , 0, 3 }, where downstream and upstream firms 3 are both unmatched, to another assignment A 2 = { 1, 2 , 2, 3 , 3, 1 } where all firms are matched. The local production maximization inequality in Property 4.1 does not allow comparing A 1 and A 2 because A 2 is not a rearrangement of downstream firm partners from A 1 : A 2 does not reallocate the former states of being unmatched. Therefore, the comparison of A 1 and A 2 is not relevant for the rank order property. However, the model of a social planner with exchangeable errors makes predictions about the relative frequencies of A 1 and A 2 based on their relative sums of production. For example, Lemma 4.1 says
. This is despite the fact that in A 1 match 3, 3 will often form if it gives more production than being unmatched, so, in many realizations of uncertainty, A 1 will not be be a stable assignment. Therefore, the rank order property is weaker than a social planner with exchangeable assignment-level errors. and deviation by agents in A 2 is more attractive in an ease metric (two matched pairs could exchange partners, leaving the third pair alone), which provides a more compelling test against the idea that the rank order property holds approximately. (15) to compute Pr (A 1 | X; f , S) − Pr (A 2 | X; f , S), a measure of how far off the rank order property is. The first line considers a standard normal distribution. As the variance is small and both A 1 and A 2 are not pairwise stable assignments in the deterministic game, the assignment probabilities are individually small. However, the difference Pr (A 1 | X; f , S) − Pr (A 2 | X; f , S) = −0.01514 is large relative to the magnitudes. The second line increases the normal standard deviation to 6. Both assignment probabilities increase to around 0.079, but the difference Pr (A 1 | X; f , S) − Pr (A 2 | X; f , S) decreases in absolute value to 0.00009. The third line increases the standard deviation to 20; now the probabilities are around 0.065, although Pr (A 1 | X; f , S) − Pr (A 2 | X; f , S) remains small, at 0.00011.
I also investigate to what degree the previous simulations relied on normality. The final three experiments in Table 1 consider asymmetric, mixed normal distributions with two modes. Again, it appears that the absolute value of Pr (A 1 | X; f , S) − Pr (A 2 | X; f , S) is smaller when the standard deviation of the errors is higher. Table 1 implies that assignment probabilities that differ by exchanges of only one downstream firm for each upstream firm are nearly rank ordered by their deterministic payoffs, when true payoffs include match-specific stochastic components. In Fox (2009), I introduce a maximum score estimator using this paper's identification results and present a Monte Carlo study that shows the estimator has good finite sample performance when the data are generated by matching games with match-specific unobservables.
Multiple Equilibrium Assignments
As argued in Section 3.3, games with complementarities across multiple downstream partners for the same upstream firm can have multiple equilibrium assignments with positive probability. In a game with multiple equilibrium assignments, (1) becomes
Let ϒ (A | X, Q; f , S) be equal to ψ 1 [A pairwise stable | X, Q, ψ] dS (ψ) . Define A 1 and A 2 as in Property 4.1. For a model with multiple equilibrium assignments, the rank order property, Property 4.1, will hold under the follow-
and only if inequality (12) holds, and 2) Pr
. Part 1 says A 1 will more likely to be stable than A 2 if A 1 has a higher production after an exchange of one downstream firm for each upstream firm in some set B 1 ⊆ A 1 . Part 2 says the equilibrium-assignment selection rule preserves the rank ordering of pairwise stability: assignments that are more likely to be pairwise stable are more likely to occur. These conditions together imply Property 4.1 and hence allow a unified framework to be used to study identification and estimation of matching games, regardless of the number of stable assignments for each ψ and X combination.
In the literature on estimating Nash games, a non-nested class with matching games, some researchers assume a particular selection rule when such a rule is easy to implement (Jia, 2008) and others use a numerical procedure and report the first equilibrium the routine converges to (Seim, 2006) . Assumptions about an equilibrium assignment selection rule may be just as arbitrary as the above approaches, but for now they are cur-rently the only feasible alternative for matching games with large numbers of agents and multiple equilibrium assignments. 22 5 Derivative-Based Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove theorems about the identification of features of production functions in many-to-many matching games, following Definition 2.1. The intuition for some of these results has been given in Section 2.5
for the case of one-to-one matching. Here, I focus on stating general theorems precisely.
As mentioned before, I will explore identification with market-level data on (A, X). Let (A, X) be i.i.d. across matching markets. With this data, I can identify both Pr (A | X) and G (X), the distribution of X across markets.
I maintain the following assumption for derivative-based identification.
Assumption 5.1.
1. Each f ∈ F is three-times differentiable in all of its arguments.
2. X has support equal to the product of the marginal supports of the scalar elements of the vectors that comprise X. Each scalar element that derivatives are taken with respect to has continuous support on an open rectangle of R.
I make this assumption to focus on cross-partial derivatives, for example. These conditions can be relaxed. 23 The features of the production functions that govern sorting depend on how the characteristics that enter 
Derivative-Based Identification with Firm-Specific Characteristics
First I consider firm-specific characteristics.
Theorem 5.2. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f . Let x be a given point of evaluation of f . Let x 1 and x 2 be scalar characteristics in x from two different firms, either one upstream firm and one downstream firm or two downstream firms. Assume
The theorem is stated for a given point of evaluation x for clarity. 24 As the theorem holds for all points of evaluation with nonzero cross-partial derivatives, the theorem establishes the global identification of the listed properties. The intuition behind the theorem was presented in Section 2.5.1. The next result follows. 22 The literature on estimating parametric Nash games, a non-nested class with matching games, presents strategies with perhaps fewer assumptions but higher computational demands in estimation for dealing with multiple equilibria. See Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2009a) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) . The nonparametric identification of other model components has not been studied while simultaneously employing these methods. 23 While there are definitions such as increasing differences (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994 ) that encompass complementarities without relying on differentiable f 's and continuous support for the x's, working with broader definitions makes the results harder to interpret and to compare to Becker's. 24 The assumption
= 0 greatly shortens the proof, which otherwise would require more complex limit arguments.
Theorem 5.3. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f . Let x 1 and x 2 be scalar characteristics in x from two different firms, and let x 3 and x 4 be two scalar characteristics from two different firms as well. The identities of the firms in the two pairs (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 3 , x 4 ) can be the same or not. Assume
is identified.
Section 2.5.2 presented the intuition for this theorem. 25 This is perhaps the most important result on identification in this paper. The ratio of the degree of complementarities,
, can be identified from qualitative data on who matches with whom.
Derivative-Based Identification with Match-Specific Characteristics
The characteristics in x (u, D u ) can be specific to the individual matches u, d . 26 In this case, the feature of f that governs sorting is f 's second derivatives.
Theorem 5.4. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f . Let the scalar x be a match-specific element of x.
Like with firm-specific characteristics, a researcher can measure the relative importance of sorting on various characteristics in the production function,
Theorem 5.5. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f . Let the two scalars x 1 and x 2 be distinct match-specific elements of x, corresponding to different matches. Assume
The theorems do not require strong properties on the characteristics not given special attention in the statement of the theorems. For example, x 1 and x 2 could be match-specific, allowing Theorem 5.5 to be applied, while x 3 -x 6 could be firm specific, requiring Theorem 5.3. The presence of the match-specific x 1 and x 2 does not invalidate applying Theorem 5.3 to x 3 -x 6 .
Derivative-Based Identification with Group-Specific Characteristics
Characteristics can be specific to a group (u, D u ) of downstream firms and the upstream firm that the downstream firms match with. An example of using the estimator in this paper for the group-characteristic case is Theorem 5.6. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f and let x be a group-specific element of x. Assume
25 The assumptions
= 0 allow Theorem 5.2 to be used in the proof and avoid division by zero in the ratio
. 26 Some might think firm-specific characteristics are a special case of match-specific characteristics. Firm-specific characteristics increase the difficulty of showing the identification of features of f 0 because the same firm characteristics must appear on the left and the right sides of a local production maximization inequality. By contrast, hypothetical markets exist where the match-specific characteristics for the matches u 1 , d 1 and u 2 , d 2 may take on any pair of values, under Assumption 5.1.
The proof of this theorem is omitted because the mathematical argument is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Theorem 5.7. Let x be a given point of evaluation of f and let the two scalars x 1 and x 2 be distinct groupspecific elements of x. Assume
∂ 2 x 1 = 0 and
Likewise, the proof is omitted because it nearly identical to that of Theorem 5.5.
6 Nonparametric Identification Up To a Positive Monotonic Transformation Section 2.6 motivated why identifying production functions up to a positive monotonic transformation is distinct from derivative-based identification. Here I focus on precise statements of general theorems.
Preliminaries for Identification Up To a Positive Monotonic Transformation
Positive monotonic transformations preserve rankings, so we must rule those transformations out.
Assumption 6.1. Let F be a class of production functions. For any two members of this class F , f 1 and f 2 , for no positive, strictly monotonic function m is it the case that f 1 (
Matzkin (1993) presents classes of functions that rule out positive monotonic transformations. An example is the class of least-concave functions.
Recall that x is one long vector of scalar characteristics. Call the first, scalar element of this vector, x 1 . Call all other elements x −1 . The collection of market characteristics is X.
Assumption 6.2.
• The conditional density of characteristic 1, g (x 1 | x −1 , X\ x), has an everywhere positive density in R. 27
• Each f ∈ F is continuous in its argument x 1 and is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in x 1 .
• X has support equal to the product of the marginal supports of the scalar elements of the vectors that comprise X.
• Each scalar element of a vector in X has either strictly discrete or strictly continuous support.
• Each f ∈ F is continuous in any scalar element of x with continuous support.
The assumption allows all but one of the characteristics in x to have discrete or qualitative support. 28 This assumption replaces the earlier Assumption 5.1, which is only for the derivative-based identification theorems. 29 27 The notation X\ x means all elements of X other than those in the specified vector x. Recall x can include firm-, match-and groupspecific characteristics. This is a slight notational abuse as x is a long vector formed from the concatenation of subvectors, rather than the set of such subvectors. 28 The assumption that the support of x 1 is R, rather than some compact subset of R, is made for convenience. Manski (1988) and Horowitz (1998) show how to relax the full support assumption for the identification of single agent, binary choice models. A continuous product quality could be a candidate for the continuous upstream product characteristic x 1 . 29 The identification arguments in this paper are not related to the identification-at-infinity arguments made in the literature on selection
The technical use of Assumption 6.2 involves the lack of a positive monotonic transformation and its relationship to a strict inequality. I state the argument in a separate lemma because the continuous-covariate argument is used in the same way in the proofs of the three identification theorems where f is learned up to a positive monotonic transformation.
Lemma 6.3. Let f 1 and f 2 be production functions in a class F satisfying Assumption 6.1. If Assumption 6.2 holds, then there exists two vectors x a and x b such that either
This lemma will be used where x a and x b are part of X for the same matching market.
Theorems for Identification Up To a Positive Monotonic Transformation
Identification proofs in the single agent maximum score tradition (Matzkin, 1993 , Theorem 1) typically amount mathematically to Lemmas 4.1 and 6.3. Consequently, the identification proof for each case focuses on an issue that is new to matching games: embedding the inequalities from Lemma 6.3 in a local production maximization inequality, meaning an inequality where each upstream firm switches at most one downstream firm at a time.
Thus, the proofs look for market characteristics X where the comparisons in Lemma 6.3 are decisive in rank ordering the production of two larger, otherwise similar assignments, A 1 and A 2 . I consider group, match and firm-specific characteristics separately. Identification is Definition 2.1 subject to the lack of a positive monotonic transformation in Assumption 6.1. I list the theorems in increasing difficulty of the proofs.
Group-specific characteristics allow the arguments of production functions to move around more flexibly than in the other cases.
Theorem 6.4. Let all elements of each x be group-specific. Then the production function is identified in the class F .
Match-specific characteristics make the identification proof more complex than before. The reason is that the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability, Definition 3.2, involves only one unmatched pair deviating at a time. To show identification, we must start with Lemma 6.3 and be able to construct local production maximization inequalities where the coalition characteristics differ by the arguments corresponding to only one match between an upstream and a downstream firm. Remember the production function requires a vector of arguments for each match of an upstream firm. To apply this and the following theorem, the maximum quota of an upstream firm must be known.
Theorem 6.5. Let all elements of each x be match-specific. Also, let there be assignments A that contain as many groups of matches as the maximum quota of an upstream firm. Then the production function is identified in the class F .
and the related work on the special regressor estimator of Lewbel (2000) . Identification based on special regressor arguments might be possible if there are match-specific regressors with full support and independence from the error terms. Arguments exist to weaken the full support assumptions (Magnac and Maurin, 2007) . Special-regressor identification arguments do not lead to tractable estimators for matching games. The Lewbel single agent, multinomial choice estimator requires multidimensional density estimation and therefore suffers from a data curse of dimensionality in the number of choices.
The theorem requires the matching market to be sufficiently large so that the comparisons needed for identification can be formed. The matching market may need to allow several firms on each side of the market because pairwise stability considers firms swapping only one partner at a time, while a production function can have as its arguments the characteristics of the matches involving many downstream firms.
An alternative way of identifying a production function involving the characteristics of the matches involving many downstream firms may be to use a solution concept such as full stability. The full stability solution concept would give inequalities where the researcher can have groups of downstream firms matched to the same upstream firm deviating at once. An achievement of this paper is to show identification without relying on the crutch of a stronger equilibrium concept: only pairwise stability is imposed. This is important, as full stability is a very strong equilibrium concept. Fully stable outcomes are less likely to exist if preferences exhibit complementarities across multiple matches and believing that a many-to-many outcome is fully stable would require a lot of communication and coordination for the agents in a decentralized matching market. I show that pairwise stability, which requires only communication between one upstream and one downstream firm at a time, is enough for point identification in many-to-many matching games where production functions are not additively separable in the characteristics of the matches for multiple downstream firms.
Firm-specific characteristics require an additional normalization. As in the example in Section 2.6, the value of being unmatched will be 0. Informally, identification considers the probabilities of assignments where certain firms are unmatched. 30 Firms that are more likely to be unmatched in an assignment are likely to have lower contributions to production.
Theorem 6.6. Let all the elements of each x be firm-specific. Let the value of any firm remaining unmatched be
Further, let there be assignments A that contain as many matched coalitions as three times the maximum quota of an upstream firm. Then the production function is identified in the class F .
Data on single or unmatched agents is often available in marriage applications. Likewise, in an analysis of mergers or business alliances, single firms could be those not participating in a merger or business alliance. In an auction, bidders who do not win any items or items that are unsold are often observed.
Conclusions
This paper discusses identification of production functions in matching games first studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) , Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Becker (1973) . These matching games allow endogenous transfers that are additively separable in payoffs. Under a pairwise stable equilibrium, production functions must satisfy inequalities that I call local production maximization: if an exchange of one downstream firm per upstream firm produces a higher production level, than it cannot be individually rational for some agent. For one-to-one matching games and many-to-many games with substitutable preferences across multiple downstream firm partners, this condition is related to social efficiency. For general many-to-many matching games it is not.
It is not obvious what types of economic parameters are identified from data on only who matches with whom. The identification theorems cover both derivative-based features of production functions and the iden-tification of production functions up to a positive monotonic transformation. The derivative-based theorems generalize the informal identification results of Becker (1973) to the case of each agent having a vector of types, many-to-many matching as well as production functions where pairs of inputs are not complements or substitutes over their entire supports. One can identify whether any two inputs are complements or substitutes. Importantly, one can identify the value of the ratio of complementarities for two pairs of inputs, at any point. Therefore, a researcher can identify the relative importance of different pairs of characteristics in match production.
The results on the identification of production functions up to a positive monotonic transformation extend the single results work of Matzkin (1993, Theorem 1) to matching games, where agents cannot unilaterally choose partners and so identification requires working with the equilibrium structure of the game. Researchers can distinguish between f 1 m 1 , w 1 = − m 1 − w 1 2 , the case of horizontal attributes, and f 2 m 1 , w 1 = 2m 1 · w 1 , the case of vertical attributes.
A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 3.3: Pairwise Stability Implies Local Production Maximization
Call this no-deviation inequality nd
is the new downstream partner of u in the permutation, letũ(π u, d ) be a function that gives the original partner of π u, d , in B 1 . So
By the definition of a permutation, each t u,d for u, d ∈ B 1 appears on both the left and right sides. The
appears on the right side with a negative sign and each deviation v down ( x (u, {π u, d })) appears on the right side with a positive sign. Moving
to the left side and substituting the definition of a production function, Definition 3.1, gives the local production maximization inequality in the lemma.
A.2 Theorem 5.2: Identification of the Sign of a Cross-Partial Derivative With FirmSpecific Covariates
The vector x is given in the statement of the theorem. To avoid confusion of the point x with the function x (u, D u ), I relabel the vector x as y inside this proof. I will focus on the case where
The proof for the case where
< 0 is very similar.
For an arbitrary f 1 ∈ F , f 1 = f 0 where
< 0, by Definition 2.1, the definition of identification of a feature of a function, I must show that there does not exist S 1 corresponding to f 1 where Pr A | X; f 0 , S 0 = Pr A | X; f 1 , S 1 for all (A, X) except perhaps a set of X of probability 0. By the key Assumption 4.1, a sufficient condition involves showing that there exists a continuum of market characteristics X with positive probability and a corresponding matching situation where f 0 and f 1 give different implications for a local production maximization inequality, of the form in Definition 3.4. At each of these markets X, there will be a particular assignment A 1 and another assignment A 2 where, by Property 4.1, Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S 0 > Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S 0 while Pr A 1 | X; f 1 , S 1 < Pr A 2 | X; f 1 , S 1 for any S 1 ∈ S . Therefore, the conditions of Definition 2.1 will be satisfied.
Let me explain the steps of the proof. First, I derive an appropriate local production maximization inequality and show that the inequality will be reversed if the production function is f 1 instead of f 0 . Second, I show how I can embed the characteristics in the local production maximization inequality into a matching market with characteristics X. Third, I show that I can locally vary all the characteristics in X to find a continuum of markets X with the property of Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S 0 > Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S 0 while Pr A 1 | X; f 1 , S 1 < Pr A 2 | X; f 1 , S 1 for any
First, I explore deriving a local production maximization inequality. Let e k = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where the 1 is in the kth position. Without loss of generality, let x 1 be the first position of x and let x 2 be the second position. One definition of a cross-partial derivative is the limit of the middle difference quotient:
Let ν > 0 be given. By the definition of a limit, we can find h > 0 such that
> 0, there will be a h 0 > 0 such that the numerator of the middle difference quotient at f = f 0 is positive, or
As
< 0, there exists h 1 > 0 where
The argument for f 1 is symmetric to the argument for f 0 and is omitted. Set h = min h 0 , h 1 . The inequalities (18) and (19) hold for any such h.
Now let me argue that (18), and by a similar argument (19), is a local production maximization inequality:
it satisfies Definition 3.4. To do this I need to form B 1 and B 2 , as in the definition, and show how a hypothetical swap of downstream firm partners could produce (18). Let
where these indices refer to arbitrary firms I am creating to show (18) In notation, either
The matches u 1 , d 2 and u 2 , d 1 form on the right side of (18). Firm d 1 , with h more of x 2 , is transferred from the set of matches u 1 , D u 1 , with h more x 1 , to the set of matches u 2 , D u 2 . Likewise, d 2 , without any more x 2 , matches to u 1 and its downstream firm partners, which together have h more x 1 than the matches involving u 2 . The important requirement that is satisfied is that each move switches the characteristics of only the firm that is actually switching. Therefore, (18) satisfies Definition 3.4 for the case of firm-specific characteristics.
The second step of the proof is that I will argue that I can embed B 1 and B 2 in an entire matching market.
Let B 3 be a larger set of matches that includes the matches corresponding to the downstream firms in D u 1 \ {d 1 } and D u 2 \ {d 2 }. The exact choice of B 3 plays no role in the proof, other than to ensure D u 1 \ {d 1 } and D u 2 \ {d 2 } are large enough given the number of non-empty elements (representing filled quota slots) in y. Then set A 1 = B 1 ∪ B 3 and A 2 = B 2 ∪ B 3 . Let there be some collection X of characteristics as in (7). The choice of X plays no role in the proof, except that characteristics itemized above must be a subset of X.
Property 4.1 and (18) imply Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S 0 > Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S 0 while Property 4.1 and (19) imply Pr A 1 | X; f 1 , S 1 < Pr A 2 | X; f 1 , S 1 for any S 1 ∈ S .
The third step of the proof is to vary all the arguments in X to show that a continuum of market characteristics give different local production maximization inequalities for f 0 and f 1 . By Assumption 5.1, X has support equal to the product of the marginal supports of the scalar elements of the vectors that comprise X. Each f is continuous by Assumption 5.1, so X can be varied locally and identification can be achieved over a set of markets with positive probability.
A.3 Theorem 5.3: Identification of Ratio of Two Cross-Partial Derivatives With FirmSpecific Covariates
We are given a point y (relabeled from x in the statement of the theorem) and there is an arbitrary f 1 ∈ F where
. The goal in broad generality is the same as the proof of Theorem 5.2: show there exists a continuum of X and two assignments A 1 and A 2 where Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S 0 > Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S 0 while Pr A 1 | X; f 1 , S 1 < Pr A 2 | X; f 1 , S 1 for any S 1 ∈ S . The proof is more challenging than the proof of Theorem 31 If x 2 is the second characteristic of x, I then say it is also the second characteristic of
. This is done for clarity: to keep "2" referring to the same variable whether I am referring to it as an element of the entire vector of production function arguments x or as an element of the vector of characteristics of firm d, x down d . 5.2 because now we are trying to identify the value of some feature of f 0 , here
, rather than just the sign of a cross-partial derivative, as before.
I will show that the term
is identified, where x 1 is the same characteristic in the numerator and the denominator. Then, by Young's / Clairaut's / Schwarz's theorem, arbitrary ratios
can be identified by comparing, say,
. Cross-partial derivatives are symmetric if the second-partial derivatives are continuous, which they are because Assumption 6.1 states f is three-times differentiable.
By Theorem 5.2, we know the signs of
if they are nonzero, as the current theorem requires. If f 1 implies different signs for
, then by Theorem 5.2 we can distinguish f 0 and f 1 . So we can restrict attention to the case where the signs of
as well as
are the same. I will first consider the case where
The other cases are discussed at the end of the proof.
The outline of the proof follows. The most novel step comes first: I find a key inequality that arises from the numerator of the middle difference quotient, (17), and that has a different direction for f 0 and f 1 . For example, this can be seen as a situation where f 0 would predict sorting on characteristics x 1 and x 2 while f 1 would predict sorting on characteristics x 1 and x 3 when sorting on both pairs simultaneously is physically impossible. The second step is that I show that this inequality is a local production maximization inequality. Some final steps follow arguments in the proof of Theorem 5.2 and are omitted for brevity.
Let h 1,2 be the limit argument from the middle difference quotient, (17), for
. Likewise, let h 1,3 be the limit argument for
. Consider the case
and let h 1,2,n n∈N be a sequence that converges to 0. Let h 1,3,n n∈N be a sequence h 1,3,n = h 1,2,n 1 2
h 1,3,n n∈N converges to 0 and
is the mean of the two ratios of cross-partial derivatives for all n ∈ N. This choice of h 1,3,n ensures
for all n ∈ N.
and ϒ h 1,2 , h 1,3 ; f = f y + h 1,2 e 1 + h 1,2 e 2 − f y + h 1,2 e 1 − f y + h 1,2 e 2 + f ( y) h 2 1,2 · f y + h 1,3 e 1 + h 1,3 e 3 − f y + h 1,3 e 1 − f y + h 1,3 e 3 + f ( y) h 2 1,3
for f ∈ F . By a definition of a cross-partial derivative, (17), the ratio ϒ h 1,2,n , h 1,3,n ; f converges to
for f ∈ f 0 , f 1 as n → ∞ and h 1,2,n , h 1,3,n → (0, 0). Then there exists some n 1 ∈ N where, for all n ≥ n 1 , n ∈ N,
for all n ≥ n 1 , n ∈ N. Define ∆ h 1,2 , h 1,3 ; f = f y + h 1,2 e 1 + h 1,2 e 2 − f y + h 1,2 e 1 − f y + h 1,2 e 2 + f ( y) − f y + h 1,3 e 1 + h 1,3 e 3 − f y + h 1,3 e 1 − f y + h 1,3 e 3 + f ( y)
for f ∈ F . Choose h 1,2 , h 1,3 = h 1,2,n , h 1,3,n . Substituting the definition of ϒ h 1,2,n , h 1,3,n ; f into (23) and resulting algebra shows that, at h 1,2 , h 1,3 , the ratios h 2 1,3,n /h 2 1,2,n cancel in all terms and
and so
At this value h 1,2 , h 1,3 , f 0 and f 1 have different signs for a key term ∆ h 1,2 , h 1,3 ; f . The same style of arguments and the same choice of h 1,3,n , (20), will apply to the case
. Only a few inequalities are reversed. Now I will argue that ∆ h 1,2 , h 1,3 ; f can be used to form a local production maximization inequality. Rearrange the inequality ∆ h 1,2 , h 1,3 ; f > 0 so that all signs are positive:
f y + h 1,2 e 1 + h 1,2 e 2 + f y + h 1,3 e 1 + f y + h 1,3 e 3 + f ( y) > f y + h 1,3 e 1 + h 1,3 e 3 + f y + h 1,2 e 1 + f y + h 1,2 e 2 + f ( y) . (25) The inequality (25) satisfies Definition 3.4 for some choice of B 1 and B 2 . Let
where the permutation π is implied by the definitions of B 1 and B 2 . As in the proof of Theorem 5.2, I can embed B 1 and B 2 into a larger matching market, construct A 1 , A 2 and X, apply the rank order property, and then vary X in a continuum to find a positive probability of markets where f 0 and f 1 give different predictions by the rank order property.
Recall that by Theorem 5.2 we can focus on cases where the signs of the cross partials are the same for f 0 and f 1 . Before we restricted attention to the case
is without loss of generality, 32 but
> 0 for f ∈ f 0 , f 1 are conditions with some loss of generality. Now we need to argue that the above arguments go through for the other three cases:
< 0. This is simple: in some of these new cases key inequalities may reverse direction, but as
for all cases, the same arguments as above will show h 1,2 , h 1,3 can be chosen to lie in between
. One this is done, the above can all be repeated without much change. One definition of a second derivative is
where as in the proof of Theorem 5.2, e 1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) is a vector of 0's except in the first element. Because
are limits, there will be some h = min h 0 , h 1 , where h 0 and h 1 are the respective limit arguments for f 0 and f 1 , where both
hold. Now I will argue that (27) and by the same argument (28) are local production maximization equations,
Also let there be sufficiently large (to handle y) sets D u 1 and D u 2 where
Let the first characteristics for matches satisfy x match
In part, there is no loss in generality because identifying
is equivalent to identifying its inverse, then (20) will involve the square root of a negative number. To fix this, let (20) involve the absolute values of
for f ∈ f 0 , f 1 . For the case
, (30) will become
. Following the steps of the algebra in the earlier argument, the 1 in (24) will be a -1 and the pair of inequalities in (24) will reverse directions once both sides are multiplied by the -1. A different local production maximization inequality will arise; otherwise the argument is similar to the earlier argument. 
At this value h 1,2 , h 1,3 , f 0 and f 1 have different signs for a key term ∆ h 1 , h 2 ; f 0 . The same style of arguments will apply to the case
. Only a few inequalities are reversed.
Now we can rearrange the inequality ∆ h 1 , h 2 ; f 0 > 0 , giving
We can show that this is a local production maximization inequality, Definition 3.4, for some choice of B 1 and
where the permutation π is implied by the definitions of B 1 and B 2 . Also,
. By inspection, it can be seen that each match in B 1 exchanges a downstream firm partner for a match in B 2 . Meanwhile, each set of arguments on the right side can be formed by replacing the characteristics associated with a single match in a set of arguments on the left side. Therefore, Definition 3.4 is satisfied.
The remainder of the proof follows arguments in previous proofs, and so is omitted.
A.6 Lemma 6.3: Continuous Characteristics for the Identification of Production Functions Up To Positive Monotonic Transformations
Without loss of generality, the goal of the proof is to show that the set
is non-empty. Let x = cat ((x 1 ) , x −1 ).
First we want to show that, again without loss of generality,
is non-empty. Assume not. Then f 1 and f 2 induce the same ordering, or preference relation in utility theory.
The "only if" direction of Theorem 1.2 in Jehle and Reny (2000) shows that there must exist some positive, strictly monotonic function m such that f 1 ( x a ) = m • f 2 ( x a ) over the range of values taken on by f 2 . As this contradicts Assumption 6.1, W 2 must be non-empty.
We have shown W 2 is non-empty. Take a point ( x a , x b ) ∈ W 2 . Then add δ 1 > 0 to the x 1 element of x a . Because f 1 is strictly increasing in x 1 , f 1 ( x a + e 1 δ 1 ) > f 1 ( x b ), where e 1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) is a vector of length equal to the length of x a . Because f 2 is continuous, there exists a δ 2 > 0 where f 2 ( x a − e 1 δ 2 ) < f 2 ( x b ) is preserved. Let δ = min {δ 1 , δ 2 }. The points x a + e 1 δ and x b satisfy the requirements of the lemma.
A.7 Theorem 6.4: Identification Up To a Positive Monotonic Transformation, Group Characteristics Let f 0 , f 1 ∈ F , where f 0 is the production function to be identified and f 1 is an alternative where f 1 ( x) = m • f 0 ( x) for all x any for any positive monotonic function m. The goal is to show there exists a continuum of X and two assignments A 1 and A 2 where Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S 0 > Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S 0 while Pr A 1 | X; f 1 , S 1 < Pr A 2 | X; f 1 , S 1 for any S 1 ∈ S .
Lemma 6.3 produces x 1 and x 2 such that f 0 ( x 1 ) > f 0 ( x 2 ) and f 1 ( x 1 ) < f 1 ( x 2 ) or f 0 ( x 1 ) < f 0 ( x 2 ) and f 1 ( x 1 ) > f 1 ( x 2 ). Focus on the first case. An inequality such as f 0 ( x 1 ) > f 0 ( x 2 ) considers a group of matches centered around an upstream firm on the left and another group of matches centered around an upstream firm on the right. This is not a local production maximization inequality (Definition 3.4), which would require at least two groups, each centered on an upstream firm, on both the left and the right.
Consider a third set of characteristics, x 3 . The exact value of x 3 will not matter for the case of group-specific characteristics. Add its production to both sides of the inequality f ( x 1 ) > f ( x 2 ) to give
This inequality is satisfied for f = f 0 ; the opposite direction is satisfied for f = f 1 .
I will now argue that this is a local production maximization inequality, Definition 3.4. Let The remainder of the proof uses quite similar arguments to those in Theorem 5.2. The four groups are embedded into a larger matching market. One can show that there is a continuum of markets X with similar properties. The main change to the argument is to allow for discrete covariates. I condition on the discrete elements of X at all steps and vary only the continuous elements to show that the set of markets X has positive probability. The case with f 0 ( x 1 ) < f 0 ( x 2 ) and f 1 ( x 1 ) > f 1 ( x 2 ) is similar: just reverse the local production maximization inequalities.
A.8 Theorem 6.5: Identification Up To a Positive Monotonic Transformation, Match Characteristics
Let f 0 , f 1 ∈ F , where f 0 is the production function to be identified and f 1 is an alternative where f 1 ( x) = m • f 0 ( x) for all x and for any positive monotonic function m. Lemma 6.3 produces x 1 and x 2 such that f 0 ( x 1 ) > f 0 ( x 2 ) and f 1 ( x 1 ) < f 1 ( x 2 ) or f 0 ( x 1 ) < f 0 ( x 2 ) and f 1 ( x 1 ) > f 1 ( x 2 ). Focus on the first case. We will now construct a local production maximization inequality. (35) This inequality will be satisfied for f = f 0 , and will be satisfied with the < direction for f = f 1 .
A local production maximization inequality must satisfy Definition 3.4. The main challenge is that each group characteristic on the right side of the inequality must differ in only one vector of match-specific characteristics from a characteristics vector on the left side. This is because the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability does not allow more than one downstream firm to switch for each upstream firm. To show that (35) is indeed a local production maximization inequality, we need to show that we can pick { w c } The rank order property says Pr A 1 | X; f 0 , S − Pr A 2 | X; f 0 , S = 0 for any S. Total match production is f (X (u, {d})) + ε u,d , with the error's distribution given in the table. The assignment is calculated using linear programming (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Chapter 8) . Each integral is simulated by using 1 million draws of the realizations for the collection of error terms for all matches and being single. Given the number of replications, the differences in the table probably do not reflect simulation error.
There are three upstream firms and three downstream firms in a one-to-one, two-sided matching game. The production of being unmatched is 0. The deterministic match production levels for matching with the three downstream firms are {3, 1, 2.8} for upstream firm 1, {1, 2.8, 1} for upstream firm 2, and {3, 1, 1} for upstream 3. I compute the probabilities for the assignments A 1 = { 1, 2 , 2, 3 , 3, 1 }, with production 1 + 1 + 3 = 5, and A 2 = { 1, 1 , 2, 3 , 3, 2 }, with production 3 + 1 + 1 = 5. I chose the example so that assignment A 2 will be "more vulnerable" to a deviation to an assignment A 3 = { 1, 1 , 2, 2 , 3, 3 } with deterministic production 3 + 2.8 + 2.8 = 8.6, as only two matched pairs in A 2 , rather than all three pairs in A 1 , need to exchange partners to deviate to A 3 . Table 2 : Proof of Theorem 6.6: Demonstrating That (37) Is a local production maximization Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Index c x (u c , {0})
